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Chapter 5: A right to time off work to undergo ART treatments 
Dr Michelle Weldon-Johns 
Abstract 
This chapter proposes a right to time off work to undergo ART treatments. Comparisons are first drawn 
with work-family rights in the UK to determine whether any could either extend to those undergoing 
treatment or provide a framework for new rights to be introduced. Lessons are then learned from the 
US experience of the right to medical leave in the Family and Medical Leave Act 1993. Two options are 
considered: namely a specific right to paid time off work to undergo ART treatments or a more general 
right to flexible, paid medical leave. A right for partners to accompany a woman undergoing treatment 
is also recommended. The challenges of undergoing treatment and the decisions of many to keep this 
private are acknowledged, suggesting that the right to medical leave may be more realistic in practice 
since it enables those undergoing treatment to do so, while valuing their rights to privacy. However, 
this is presented as the starting point in the process of recognising those undergoing ART treatments 
within the legal framework, with the possibility of more specific rights envisaged for the future. 
Introduction 
In this final chapter it is argued that the current limitations of UK equality law protection are only one 
facet of the problem facing those undergoing ART treatments, and that specific employment rights 
are also necessary. In particular, the absence of a specific right to time off work enabling employees 
to undergo ART treatments leaves them vulnerable to dismissal and/or less favourable treatment.1 
This is particularly the case if a reinterpretation of the scope of equality law cannot be achieved but is 
equally important alongside this. The gaps in the current employment law framework concerning 
rights to time off work are examined first. This shows that while those undergoing ART treatments are 
excluded from many of these rights, there are already frameworks in place that could either be 
extended to include those undergoing ART treatments or used as a model to develop new rights. 
Comparisons are again drawn with the experience in the US and the right to medical leave under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 (FMLA).2 While the FMLA does not necessarily offer a right to leave 
for those involved in ART treatments in the US,3 the legal framework is used as a model which can be 
modified in the UK context. Drawing from this, two alternatives are considered, namely: a specific 
right to paid time off work to undergo ART treatments and a more general right to flexible, paid 
1 As was argued in Sahota v The Home Office [2010] 2 CMLR 29, [3]. 
2 Public Law 103-3. 
3 Katie Cushing, ‘Facing Reality: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act Falls Short for Women Undergoing Infertility 
Treatment’ [2010] 40 Seton Hall Law Review 1697, 1725-1726. 
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medical leave. Given the challenges of undergoing treatment and the desire of many to keep this 
private, it is acknowledged that the right to medical leave may be more realistic in practice. However, 
more specific rights would be preferable to recognise the increasing normalisation of treatment and 
reduce the stigma and burdens many of those undergoing treatment face. Consequently, the 
possibility of more specific rights is envisaged for the future. 
 
Combining work and ART treatment: without a legal framework 
The cases involving those undergoing ART treatments have highlighted the vulnerability of the 
employment security of those undergoing treatment because of the lack of legal framework enabling 
them to combine treatment with work. While individuals have made use of statutory and/or employer 
rights to sick leave and pay, where it is provided, the cases discussed previously underscored that 
these frameworks have proven insufficient on their own. In the UK context, guidance from both the 
EHRC and ACAS reinforce that there is no clear legal framework here. 4  While employers are 
encouraged to act sympathetically to employees engaged in treatment,5 employer responses are 
varied in practice,6 leaving those undergoing treatment without any clear guidance on how treatment 
may impact on their employment security. There are several rights that either do or could be extended 
to those undergoing ART treatments. These include: the right to statutory sick pay (SSP); the right to 
request flexible working; and rights to time off during the ante-natal period. 
 
4.1.1 Statutory sick pay 
The right to SSP does not afford employees with a specific right to time off work to attend 
appointments and/or undergo treatment. Instead the right is framed as a right to wage replacement 
while the employee is unable to work because of a verified medical reason. Under the Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (SSCBA), s.151(4) limits the instances when SSP is paid in respect 
of a day of incapacity for work, meaning that they are unable to do reasonably expected work because 
of illness or disablement. While it is entirely possible to conceptualise infertility and/or undergoing 
ART treatment as a physical disablement, as argued in chapter three, the requirement that it render 
the individual incapable of doing the work they are contracted to do could be more difficult to satisfy. 
When the individual is undergoing specific treatments, it is more likely that this could be satisfied, but 
other appointments may not be as easily included within this definition. The application of SSP is also 
                                                          
4 Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), Equality Act 2010: Employment Statutory Code of Practice 
(EHRC, 2011) 8.44 and 17.28-17.29; ACAS (Advice, Conciliation and Arbitration Service), Employees' rights 
during IVF treatment <https://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=5457> accessed 30 July 2019. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Nicola Payne, Susan Seenan and Olga van den Akker, ‘Experiences and psychological distress of fertility 
treatment and employment’ [2019] 40(2) Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynecology 156, 159-160. 
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limited in practice because it requires a minimum period of 4 consecutive days of incapacity before it 
is engaged. 7  Given that the treatment necessitating absence from work often occurs over a 
discontinuous but concentrated period it is unlikely that it will always satisfy the requirement of 
consecutive days of incapacity required here. It must also fall within a period of entitlement, which 
begins when the period of incapacity begins and ends: when that period ends; when the entitlement 
to SSP ends; when the contract ends; or if in the case of a pregnant employee, when the disqualifying 
period begins.8 However, if there are two periods of incapacity for the same reason, within an eight-
week period, this will be treated as a single period of incapacity,9 meaning that there is no requirement 
for an additional three-day waiting period. This could be useful for those undergoing treatments, if 
the first period of incapacity met the requirements. It must also be a qualifying day, meaning a day in 
which they are required to work,10 and they must earn more than the lower earnings limit.11 The 
maximum amount of SSP is 28 weeks’ pay in any 3-year period,12 which is capped at the statutory 
amount currently £94.25.13 The maximum period of leave may be challenging for those undergoing 
multiple cycles of treatment, particularly alongside ordinary sickness absences. 
 
While these provisions allow for payments to be made while an employee is absent from work, they 
provide no right to time off work and no protections against detriments and/or dismissal while doing 
so. Consequently, an individual remains vulnerable to dismissal for absences from work as a 
potentially fair reason for dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). Periods of absence 
could be used to justify dismissal on the grounds of capability, relating to ill health, or conduct,14 which 
is particularly likely where there is a persistent level of short-term absences from work, often with 
little notice, as would be the case for those undergoing ART treatments. However, an employer must 
still consider the employee’s situation and reasons for absence as well as provide warnings, as 
appropriate, that continued absences could result in dismissal.15 Nevertheless, the lack of specific 
rights to time off work to undergo treatment leaves employees vulnerable to dismissal, and/or having 
to choose to forgo ART treatments, because of the employer’s application of their absence 
management policies.  
                                                          
7 SSCBA, s.152(2) and s.155(1). 
8 Ibid, s.153(1)-(2). 
9 Ibid, s.152(3). 
10 Ibid, s.154. 
11 Ibid, sch.11, para.2 and s.5(1)(a). 
12 Ibid, s.155(4). 
13 Ibid, s.157. 
14 Ibid, s.98(2)(a)-(b). 
15 See further: Astra Emir, Selwyn’s Law of Employment (20th edn, OUP 2018) paras 17.103-17.113. 
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The right to request flexible working 
The right to request flexible working offers a potential framework that could enable those undergoing 
ART treatments to combine treatment while remaining in work. This right extends to all employees 
with 26 weeks continuity of employment. 16  Previously this was limited to persons with caring 
responsibilities, but is no longer restricted to certain groups now extending to all employees.17 This 
enables an employee to request a change in their hours, time and/or place of work.18 Changes made 
are permanent, although the statute requires that the employee ‘specify the changes applied for’ 
when making their application, which would appear to allow, or at least not prevent, changes of 
limited duration being applied for in the original request.19 This could be useful for those undergoing 
ART treatment as it would, in principle, enable them to modify their working arrangements to allow 
them to undergo a course of treatment.  
 
However, this right is only a right to request flexible working and not a right to change working 
patterns and is consequently a ‘weak’ right in practice.20 The burdens on the employee making the 
request are high. They must specify: that it is such a request; the changes sought and when they would 
come into effect; and identify the effect it would have on the employer and how that could be dealt 
with.21 The employer, in contrast, has only an obligation to ‘deal with the application in a reasonable 
manner’ and to inform the employee of their decision.22 There are no requirements for the decision 
to be reasonable and no recourse to challenge the reasonableness of the decision itself.23 Although, 
when first enacted Anderson suggested that the requirement to put the reasons for refusal in writing 
could be useful for employees pursuing claims on other grounds, e.g. discrimination.24 Nevertheless, 
the employer can justify their refusal of the request on numerous grounds,25 making it easy for them 
to deny requests in practice. If they do refuse, the employee will have to wait another year before 
making a new request as only one can be made in a one-year period.26 
 
                                                          
16 Flexible Working Regulations 2014, SI2014/1398, Reg.3. 
17 Children and Families Act 2014, s.131. 
18 ERA, s.80F(1). 
19 Ibid, s.80F(2)(b). 
20 Grace James, ‘The Work and Families Act 2006: Legislation to Improve Choice and Flexibility?’ [2006] 35(3) 
ILJ 272, 277. 
21 ERA, s.80F(2). 
22 Ibid, s.80G(4)(1)(a)-(aa). 
23 Ibid, s.80H. Grace James, ‘Mothers and Fathers as Parents and Workers; Family Friendly Employment Policies 
in an Era of Shifting Identities’ [2009] 31(3) JSWFL 271, 278. 
24 Lucy Anderson, ‘Sound Bite Legislation: The Employment Act 2002 and New Flexible Working ‘Rights’ for 
Parents’ [2003] 32(1) ILJ 37, 41. 
25 ERA, s.80G(4)(1)(b). 
26 Ibid, s.80F(4). 
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While requesting a change in working arrangement may be beneficial for those undergoing ART 
treatments during the treatment process, this is unlikely to require a permanent change in working 
arrangements. Even if an employer were to accept a temporary change in working arrangements, 
given the unpredictability of success rates for treatment this may be insufficient. In addition, given the 
specificity required in making such a request in the first instance,27 the changes made may be not be 
sufficiently flexible to respond to the, at times, unpredictable requirements of treatment. 
Furthermore, the lack of guarantees that requests will be granted as well as the acceptable timeframes 
in which decisions should be made,28 means that this right in practice offers little support for those 
undergoing ART treatments to re-arrange their work to accommodate treatment. 
 
Rights to time off during the ante-natal period 
 There are several rights to time off during the ante-natal or pre-placement for adoption period that 
could be extended to include those undergoing ART treatments. These include: the right to paid time 
off for ante-natal care for the pregnant employee;29 the unpaid right of a partner of a pregnant woman 
and of commissioning parents in surrogacy situations, to accompany the pregnant woman when 
attending two ante-natal appointments;30 and the rights of adopting parents to attend either five paid 
or two unpaid pre-placement meetings. 31  While there are various limitations to these rights 
themselves, particularly given the limited number of appointments and lack of paid leave for 
‘secondary’ parents,32 some lessons can be learned for those undergoing ART treatments. Also notable 
is that employees utilising these rights are protected by the right not to suffer a detriment and 
protection against dismissal if the reason, or principle reason, is because they exercised any of these 
rights.33 This ensures that not only can they access these rights, but they are protected while doing so. 
Any rights extended to those undergoing ART treatments should also include these protections. The 
potential of these rights, and the underpinning legal frameworks, to extend to those undergoing ART 
treatments and their partners are considered in turn.  
 
An analogous right to time off work to undergo ART treatments could be created mirroring the 
framework of the right to paid time off work to attend ante-natal appointments. This right is not 
limited by any continuity of employment requirements, nor is it limited to a specific length of time per 
                                                          
27 Hussain v Consumer Credit Counselling, ET Case No.1804305/04. 
28 Within 3 months or longer if both agree: ERA, s.80G(1B). 
29 Ibid, ss.55-57. 
30 Ibid, ss.57ZE-57ZF. 
31 Ibid, ss.57ZE(7)(e)-(f). 
32 Michelle Weldon-Johns, ‘From modern workplaces to modern families – re-envisioning the work–family 
conflict’ [2015] 37(4) JSWFL 395, 405-406. 
33 ERA, s.47C and s.99. 
6 
 
appointment. The only limitations are that the employee is pregnant and that she has been advised 
to attend such appointments by a medical practitioner, registered midwife or registered nurse.34 
Other than for the first appointment, the employer can request evidence of the employee’s pregnancy 
and of appointments scheduled. 35  A similar right for those undergoing ART treatments would 
recognise that such employees require comparable access to medical appointments and/or 
treatment, and a corresponding right to paid time off to facilitate this. Such a right could be framed in 
the same way as the right to ante-natal care, with employers having the right to request evidence of 
undergoing treatment and of appointments scheduled in the same way, as well as having not being 
able to refuse access to such treatment. Such a right offers the ideal response to the current gap in 
the legal framework, because it would signify that this experience is valued and would facilitate its 
normalisation. While recent research undertaken by Payne et al shows that most people undergoing 
treatment do disclose this to their employer in order to gain time off work, many would still prefer 
not to. The reasons given include: privacy; not understanding; negative career impact, including the 
tensions between work and undergoing treatment; stigma; negative attitudes; confidences being 
breached and not wanting special treatment.36 The lack of a legal framework and consequent diversity 
in employer’s responses was also a factor.37 While this research indicates that specific employment 
rights would be beneficial here, it also underscores that this may be challenging for those who do not 
want to disclose, particularly in the absence of overarching equality law protections. Consequently, a 
similar framework could be used to underpin an equivalent general right to leave for those undergoing 
treatment, discussed further below.   
 
A similar right for a partner to take time off to accompany a woman undergoing ART treatments to 
that available to partners of pregnant women would also be beneficial here. However, the right to 
unpaid time off to accompany a pregnant woman to two ante-natal appointments of a maximum of 
6.5 hours each is insufficient for pregnancy,38 let alone for those undergoing ART treatments. A more 
useful framework is that provided for adoptive parents, where one parent is entitled to attend five 
paid pre-placement meetings,39 although the other is only entitled to unpaid time off to attend two 
such appointments. 40  Focusing on the former right, the employee is entitled to attend these 
appointment subject to providing the employer with evidence, if requested, of the appointment and 
                                                          
34 ERA, s.55(1). 
35 Ibid, ss.55(2)-(3). 
36 Payne, Seenan and van den Akker (n.5), 160-163. 
37 Ibid, 156-157 and 159. 
38 ERA, ss.57ZE(2)-(3); Weldon-Johns (n.32), 405-406. 
39 Ibid, ss.57ZJ(4)-(5) and s.57ZK. 
40 Ibid, s.57ZL. 
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that the employee has elected to exercise this right where they are one of two joint adopters.41 While 
these are also limited to 6.5 hours off per appointment,42 they otherwise provide enhanced rights in 
comparison with partners and commissioning parents. While this is an attempt to mirror the 
framework for pregnant employees, it nevertheless fails to adequately reflect the position of 
alternative family forms.43 However, it does offer a useful starting point in the developing a framework 
for the partners of those undergoing ART treatments. While it also may be unnecessary for the partner 
to accompany the woman to all appointments, a more broadly defined right to attend a greater 
number of appointments, particularly those during which treatment will be carried out, would be 
welcome. The position of commissioning parents in surrogacy should not be forgotten here. While 
certain rights have been extended to them, as discussed in chapter two, these focus on the post-
conception period and similarly ignore their experiences in their journey to parenthood which begin 
much earlier and may also involve them personally undergoing ART treatments. Consequently, the 
rights proposed here would similarly extend to them, including enabling them to attend ART 
appointments with the surrogate. While it would also be preferable to frame this as a right to 
accompany someone undergoing ART treatments, similar concerns raised above are equally 
applicable here. Nevertheless, this framework also offers a useful starting point to propose an 
equivalent right to accompany a someone undergoing treatment, discussed further below.  
 
This discussion of current UK work-family rights underscores the limitations of the existing 
frameworks, but also the potential for rights to be extended to those undergoing ART treatments, 
their partners and commissioning parents. This discussion has also highlighted the potential 
challenges of opting for specific rights for those undergoing ART treatments with requirements of 
disclosure, particularly without an overarching equality law framework extending protection to them 
throughout the treatment process. The following section examines the possibility of a more general 
right to medical leave to address this gap, with reference to the experience in the US. 
 
A right to medical leave 
An alternative to a specific rights approach is instead enacting a more general right to medical leave. 
This could address some of the concerns regarding disclosure and could be related to the rights already 
available under the SSP framework. However, proposing a right to medical leave is also problematic 
because it returns to the comparison and assimilation with sickness, which pregnancy discrimination 
has strived to move away from. However, unlike pregnancy, those undergoing ART treatments are 
                                                          
41 ERA, ss.57ZJ(8)-(9). 
42 Ibid, s.57ZJ(6). 
43 Weldon-Johns (n.32), 405-406. 
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engaged in medical treatments and procedures. In these respects, the need to accommodate time off 
to undergo treatment and attend appointments can be conceptualised as a right to time off for 
medical leave. The experience of the US is again relevant here and the rights to leave contained within 
the FMLA are considered next to assess what lessons can be learned from them.  
 
The US Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 
The FMLA contains gender-neutral rights to leave for either family or medical purposes. The right does 
not automatically include those undergoing ART treatments, although its potential to do so is 
considered below. The rights are only available to those employees who satisfy certain fairly restrictive 
conditions. In the first instance, the employee must have 12 months continuous service with their 
current employer and have worked a minimum of 1250 hours in the previous 12 months period.44 This 
requirement restricts the rights to US citizens, with an established labour market attachment and 
those who work full-time or long part-time working hours. Such a requirement excludes many 
employees, particularly those in atypical or part-time work. There are also specific exceptions to these 
provisions for certain Federal officers or employees, and employers engaging less than 50 employees 
at a particular worksite and within a 75-mile radius.45 Consequently, many employees fall outside of 
the scope of the Act in practice. There are also certain restrictions that may prevent employees using 
leave. While employees have the right to return to work in their previous or an equivalent position if 
they do so before or at the end of the maximum leave period,46 there is a specific exception for those 
within the highest paid 10% of the company.47 This exception applies when the return of such an 
employee would result in severe economic loss to the employer. 48  This may further reduce the 
number of employees who request leave under the Act in practice.    
 
For those who do qualify, they are entitled to a total of 12 normal work weeks of unpaid leave, for 
either family or medical purposes, during any 12-month period.49 There are three categories of rights 
they can utilise: two rights to family care leave; the right to medical leave; and a right relating to having 
a family member in the armed forces. 50  The family care situations encompass two distinct 
circumstances: the care of children on entering the family, and the care of family members who are 
                                                          
44 FMLA, § 101(2)(A). 
45 Ibid, § 101(2)(B). 
46 Ibid, §104(a)(1). Further defined: 29 CFR 825, (Code of Federal Regulations, The Family and Medical Leave 
Act), (29 CFR 825) §825.214-§825.215. 
47 Ibid, §104(b)(2). Further defined: 29 CFR 825, §825.217. 
48 Ibid, §104(b)(1). Further defined in: 29 CFR 825, §825.218. 
49 Ibid, §§ 102(a)(1) and (c). 
50 Ibid, § 102(a)(1)  
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ill. For present purposes, the most relevant is the right to medical leave, which can be used because 
of a serious health condition which prevents them from working. 51 
 
For those undergoing ART treatments in the US, the question of whether they would be entitled to 
leave under the FMLA turns on whether this is a serious health condition. This is defined as: ‘illnesses, 
injuries, impairments, or physical or mental conditions which involve inpatient care’ or ‘continuing 
treatment by a health care provider.’ 52  Continuing treatment is further defined as a period of 
incapacity of more than three consecutive days and any related treatment or period of incapacity that 
also includes: two or more treatments within 30 days of the first day of incapacity; or at least one 
treatment with related course of treatment under the supervision of the health care provider.53 
Infertility and/or undergoing ART treatment can relate to a physical impairment or condition that at 
times requires inpatient care and/or continuing treatment. This will often include two or more 
treatments within a 30-day period and/or a course of treatment following an initial procedure. Given 
that infertility has been recognised within the scope of the ADA it is likely that it would fall within the 
definition of serious health condition here too.54 However, the requirement for more than three 
consecutive days incapacity in the first instance and whether all related appointments and the impact 
of treatment are included is unclear.  
 
This issue was considered, in part, by the US Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit in Culpepper v BlueCross 
BlueShield of Tennessee Inc.55 In this case the plaintiff had 13 days of unexcused absence on her record 
that was contrary to her employer’s Incident Report Policy, which permitted dismissal after more than 
5 such absences. Culpepper argued that 11 of these were related to undergoing ART treatments and 
had medical evidence that supported two separate periods of three-day absences relating to 
treatment, which the employer accepted were covered by the FMLA. Notably, the previous District 
Court observed that the Act requires more than three days absence in order to amount to a serious 
health condition but did not consider this further as the employer had waived their right to challenge 
it by granting leave.56  The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court decision to grant summary 
judgment to the employer because there was insufficient medical evidence to support her claim that 
she was incapable of working, per the requirements of the FMLA, during the other absences.57 This 
                                                          
51 FMLA, § 102(a)(1)(D). 
52 Ibid, §101(11). Further defined: 29 CFR 825, §825.113-§825.115. 
53 29 CFR 825, §825.102 and §825.115. 
54 Kerry Van der Burch, ‘Courts’ Struggle with Infertility: The Impact of Hall v. Nalco on Infertility-Related 
Employment Discrimination’ [2010] 81 University of Colorado L Rev 545, 575-577. 
55 No. 08-5204. 
56 Culpepper v BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee Inc No. 1:07-CV-48, fn1. 
57 Culpepper (n.55), 9-11. 
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decision underscores the difficulty of each period of absence meeting the requisite standard of 
incapability and importance of unequivocal medical evidence to support every absence, even when 
parts of the period may be included within the scope of the FMLA. While this appears to suggest that 
undergoing ART treatments can fall within the scope of the FMLA, given that it was not contested 
here, it is questionable whether anything can be learned from the decision with respect to the rights 
of those undergoing ART treatments. 
 
While the decision does not directly endorse the employer’s decision to accept undergoing IVF 
treatment within the scope of the FMLA, there are two possible readings of it. Optimistically, the 
decision can be viewed as supporting the possibility that undergoing ART treatments is within the 
scope of serious health conditions if sufficient medical evidence is produced to support incapability 
for work while undergoing treatment. This was the case here with respect to the excused periods. 
Medical evidence was provided by her doctor who classified undergoing IVF treatment as a serious 
health condition for the purposes of the FMLA.58 More realistically, it reinforces the challenges of 
satisfying this definition in practice. The treatment, and/or its effects, must last at for at least four 
consecutive days for the FMLA to apply. Thus, meaning that initial investigations, one-off procedures 
and treatments are unlikely to satisfy this definition. This mirrors the problem in the UK context with 
the availability of SSP. On balance, it probably reflects a mid-point of view. Some treatments will fall 
within the scope of the FMLA, but not all,59 again mirroring the patch-work of rights available in the 
UK context. With that in mind, what lessons can be learned from the US experience?  
 
There are several other aspects of the US experience that can be drawn from in developing an 
equivalent right in the UK. For instance, the right to medical leave can be taken on an intermittent 
basis or on a reduced leave schedule, where is it deemed medically necessary.60 This enables the 
qualifying employee to either take separate periods of leave relating to the same condition, or to 
reduce their working schedule, usually in terms of days or hours, for a specific period.61 There has to 
be a medical reason as to why leave should be taken in this way,62 and the employee must make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that any treatment scheduled does not unduly interfere with the 
employer’s operations.63 The overall maximum duration of leave remains 12 normal work weeks, so 
                                                          
58 Culpepper (n.55), 2-3.  
59 Cushing (n.3), 1725-1726. 
60 FMLA, §102(b)(1). 
61 29 CFR 825, §825.202. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, §825.203. 
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employees do not lose any entitlements by using leave in this way. 64  If those undergoing ART 
treatments were accepted within the scope of the legislation, this flexibility would be beneficial 
because often treatments require numerous appointments and absences over a concentrated, but 
not necessarily continuous period. Given that the required flexibility would be directly related to 
undergoing treatment, it is likely to be considered medically necessary by their health care provider 
and so should meet the qualifying criteria here. This reinforces the importance of the possibility of 
flexible working arrangements that genuinely enable employees to combine work with other life 
commitments.  
 
The availability of flexibility in notification requirements would also be beneficial for those undergoing 
ART treatments. Under the FMLA if the requirement for leave is foreseeable, the employee must make 
reasonable efforts to schedule treatment in such in a way that it does not unduly interfere with the 
employer’s operations and provide the employer with at least 30 days’ notice, or as soon as is 
practicable if treatment must begin sooner, of their intention to undergo treatment.65 For those 
undergoing ART treatments, it may be challenging to meet the 30 day requirement because of the 
sometimes unpredictable and time-sensitive requirements for treatment. While notice should then 
be given as soon as is practicable, this could result in the employee taking leave before they know if it 
is covered by the Act, leaving them vulnerable to disciplinary action if it is not.66 While a degree of 
flexibility is beneficial here, it is most effective when it enables individuals to exercise rights in practice. 
Consequently, an expediated decision-making process in those instances would also be useful. 
 
The US experience also highlights that the most limited aspect of this right is the absence of a 
requirement for paid leave.67 It is possible for an employer to provide paid leave or for an employee 
to decide, or an employer to require, that the leave be substituted with accrued leave which has a 
paid element.68 However, this often means foregoing another right to paid leave, and many workers 
will only be entitled to unpaid leave. This reinforces the importance of creating a stand-alone right to 
paid leave in the UK context, and/or linking this with existing rights to SSP. 
 
While the right to medical leave in the US has many shortcomings and may not actually include those 
undergoing ART treatments within its scope, it nevertheless provides a useful framework for 
                                                          
64 FMLA, §102(b)(1). 
65 Ibid, §102(e)(2). 
66 As seen in Culpepper (n.55). 
67 FMLA, §102(c). 
68 Ibid, §§ 102(d). See further: 29 CFR 825, §825.207. 
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developing a similar right in the UK. It reinforces the importance of creating a right to leave, which 
clearly includes those undergoing ART treatments within its scope. The qualifying criteria should also 
not be so onerous as to exclude most employees from its scope. There should be flexibility in the 
notice requirements, and in how the rights can be utilised in practice. It also should be a right to paid 
leave, and there should be sufficient employment protection provisions both during leave and on 
returning to work to not only encourage people to use but also protect them while doing so.  
 
A right to time off work to undergo ART treatments: Possibilities for the UK 
The foregoing has shown the importance of creating a clear right to leave that will enable those 
undergoing ART treatments to take paid time off work to do so, while also ensuring their privacy 
regarding undergoing treatment. A right to medical leave offers the most suitable solution here. The 
experiences of the US coupled with the existing frameworks in the UK indicate that a general right to 
medical leave can offer some potential here. This right could be expressed as: a right to time off work 
to attend medical appointments and/or undergo treatment relating to a serious health condition. Such 
treatment may include: investigatory appointments and/or procedures, outpatient and/or inpatient 
treatments. This would mirror the US framework to some extent. It is acknowledged that the 
reference to a ‘serious health condition’ could be problematic, because adopting a narrow 
interpretation here could exclude those undergoing ART treatments. However, in Culpepper the 
exclusion of absences from the FMLA was largely related to the requirement for a minimum of more 
than three consecutive days incapacity, rather than the seriousness of the health condition itself.69 
Furthermore, it is likely to be preferable, from a policy point of view, to limit those entitled to this 
right so that it does not include all routine appointments with health care providers. Consequently, 
the requirement for treatment to be related to a serious health condition would ensure that it was 
not overbroad and other steps could be taken to ensure those undergoing ART treatments are 
included. This could be achieved by including those undergoing ART treatments, for whatever reason, 
within the scope of the definition of serious health conditions in the legislation.  
 
Given that the rights to attend and accompany those attending ante-natal appointments contain no 
continuity of employment requirements, the right to medical leave should similarly be a day-one right. 
This would ensure that all employees are entitled to time off for such purposes. Qualifying conditions 
shoule relate solely to the production of relevant medical evidence of the dates and times of 
appointments and/or treatments, as well as confirmation by the medical practitioner that they are 
related to a serious health condition, as defined in the legislation. This could be framed in such a way 
                                                          
69 Although this was not directly examined. 
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that the specific health condition does not need to be identified, to ensure that employee’s desire not 
to disclose would not be compromised but would still require confirmation of such a condition by a 
prescribed medical practitioner. 
 
The right should be framed as a right to paid leave. While it would be preferable to also frame this as 
a day-one right, other rights to leave in the UK separate the entitlement to leave from that to pay. A 
similar approach would be consistent with that. As a minimum this could replicate the right to SSP, 
and its qualifying conditions regarding pay. This would ensure consistency and would also enhance 
those rights by ensuring that individuals requiring time off to undergo medical treatment and/or 
attend medical appointments have the right to time off work in order to do so. However, if it were to 
be intrinsically linked to the right to SSP then individuals would not be covered for one-off 
appointments, at least under the current legal framework. Given that the requirement for minimum 
days of incapacity in the first instance has been a potential barrier in the US context, this requirement 
should not be replicated in UK legislation. Instead, this could be amended to allow payments to be 
made to those undergoing such treatment, with these periods being deducted from the overall SSP 
benefit entitlement.  
 
If the right is framed as a specific right to medical leave that can be used in any given 12-month period 
then it should be long enough to facilitate undergoing a course of treatment, and flexible enough to 
recognise that not all courses of treatment are continuous and require consecutive periods of 
absence. The right to 12 weeks medical leave in the US offers a useful comparison here. It is longer 
than the 28-week benefit entitlement to SSP, which extends over 3 years, but is in any event 
distinguishable from it because that applies more generally to incapacity for work and not just 
attending medical appointments and/or undergoing treatment. This again underscores that while 
there is a potential connection between these rights, there are clear distinctions between the 
purposes of both. However, the right to medical leave could be mapped onto SSP if the overall period 
was extended. This could reduce the potential burdens on business in implementing this right in 
practice.  
 
The possibility for flexibility in the utilisation of the leave, as is possible in the US, would also be 
beneficial here. This could facilitate a range of flexible working options including: continuous periods 
of absence; single days; partial days; and reduced daily working hours. Specifying the right in terms of 
days leave or hours could further support this as opposed to focusing on weekly periods, the problems 
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with which were evident in the context of the right to unpaid parental leave.70 While this flexibility is 
unlikely to be welcomed by employers, a requirement that the medical practitioner treating the 
employee recommend and/or support the employees use of leave in this way to facilitate treatment 
should prevent misuse in practice. Framing the right in this way would help address some of the 
inflexibility concerns raised above with using the right to request flexible working to accommodate 
treatment, while enabling employees to create flexibility on a temporary basis. 
 
Alongside the right to time off work to attend medical appointments, there should also be a day-one 
right to paid time off work to accompany someone attending such appointments. This would again be 
akin to the existing framework relating to ante-natal and adoption placement meetings and could be 
limited to a certain number or certain kind of appointments, such as when they are undergoing 
significant forms of treatment, where additional care and/or support may be beneficial and/or 
required. Again, employers could request a declaration of the appointment information and that the 
employee is in a recognised relationship with the person undergoing treatment, in the same way as is 
currently required for those attending ante-natal appointments.  
 
To strengthen these rights, they should be accompanied with both the right not to suffer a detriment 
and the right to protection against dismissal for utilising, proposing to use or having exercised them. 
The framework for such protections is also present in the ERA in relation to other rights to time off 
work and could again be mirrored here. This is even more important if the overarching equality law 
framework has not been extended to include those undergoing ART treatments. 
 
The foregoing shows that a right to leave that would enable those undergoing ART treatments to take 
time off work to attend such appointments and/or undergo treatments is both conceptually and 
practically consistent with the current UK legal framework. Whether this is expressed as a specific 
right to time off to undergo ART treatments, or a more general right to medical leave, the existing 
rights around pregnancy and the pre-natal period, as well as right to SSP, offer useful starting points 
to extend rights in a meaningful way. Drawing from the lessons of the US experience, a flexible, paid, 
day-one right to leave, that includes employment protection, and that extends not only to those 
undergoing treatment, but also in some instances their partners and commissioning parents, would 
ensure that those engaged in treatment can do so without having the additional burden of job 
insecurity. This is all the more important if a reinterpretation of the boundaries of the equality law 
frameworks cannot be achieved but remains so even if they are.  
                                                          




The right to time off work to undergo ART treatments is integral to the development of a legal 
framework that both recognises and values the experiences of those engaged in ART treatments. 
While a specific right aimed solely at those undergoing treatment is preferable, the realities of the 
difficulties in exercising such a right in practice are acknowledged. These challenges are particularly 
marked in the absence of an overarching equality law framework that affords protection to those 
undergoing ART treatments. Consequently, the more general right to medical leave presented here 
offers a more meaningful solution in the meantime. Drawing from the experience in the US, this 
analysis has shown that it is possible to expand the current UK work-family rights framework to include 
such a right. This could easily mirror the other rights that enable employees to take time off work for 
reasons relating to care and/or impending parenthood. The extension of these rights to either 
specifically those undergoing ART treatments or in the form of a more general, but still focused, right 
to medical leave would be both practically and conceptually consistent with the existing frameworks. 
This would be an important step forward in ensuring that those undergoing ART treatments are both 
recognised and protected within the UK legal framework, as they attempt to combine treatment while 
retaining their labour market position. Indeed, it may be the first step necessary to facilitate the 
broader reinterpretation of the boundaries of equality law. 
